It is a well-established view in the Philosophy of Science that scientific theories introduce new terms, so-called theoretical terms. They denote properties, usually functional properties, which go beyond what is observable or given by common sense. Their meaning is not pre-theoretically given. It is specified by nothing else but the theory itself. The same holds for the denotations of theoretical terms -these denotations are not pre-theoretically given but are hypothetically postulated by the theory. Consider, as our main example, the way how mass and force are characterized by the axioms of Newtonian physics:
The Semantics of Theoretical Terms
It is a well-established view in the Philosophy of Science that scientific theories introduce new terms, so-called theoretical terms. They denote properties, usually functional properties, which go beyond what is observable or given by common sense. Their meaning is not pre-theoretically given. It is specified by nothing else but the theory itself. The same holds for the denotations of theoretical terms -these denotations are not pre-theoretically given but are hypothetically postulated by the theory. Consider, as our main example, the way how mass and force are characterized by the axioms of Newtonian physics:
(N1) For all physical objects x and times t: The sum of all forces acting on x at t equals the mass of x times the acceleration of x at t.
(N2) Whenever x exhibits a force onto y, then y exhibits a force of the same amount and opposite direction onto x.
(NG) For all x, y and t, the gravitational force between x and y at t equals the amount of g·m(x)·m (y) |s(x,t)−s(y,t| 2 with the direction pointing from x to y and vice versa.
Three things are very typical in this theory T : (1.) The theory T itself is specified by a finite set of axioms. So we may identify T with a single statement -the conjunction of its axioms.
(2.) The only observational or pre-theoretical concepts in Newtonian physics are object, time, and position as a dependent function of object and time, plus its derivatives w.r.t. time, velocity and acceleration. The meaning of the two T -theoretical concepts, namely mass and force, is simultaneously characterized by the axiom of T .
(3.) The meaning of mass and force is not given by observation, common sense, or in any other theory-independent way. For example, it would be inadequate to regard the common sense meaning of force as 'something which pushes or pulls' as the semantic core of the meaning of this term.
(4.) The theory is expandable by adding more special force laws such as frictional forces, which emerge only under certain conditions.
We call a theoretical term more specifically a T-theoretical term; this indicates that the meaning the term is characterized by or within theory T . When we call a term T -theoretical we always assume that T contains all of the theory which is relevant for specifying the meaning of this term. Those terms in a theory T whose meaning is given independently of T , for example by observation, common sense or by means of pre-theories of lower level, are called pre-T-theoretical terms. So the general picture and notation is this:
A theory T = T (τ 1 , . . . , τ n ) is a statement with T -theoretical terms τ 1 , . . . , τ n , which are usually predicate or function terms, and with pre-T -theoretical terms p 1 , . . . , p m , whose meaning is independently given (by observation or pre-theoretical means). The underlying language L (T ) consists of all formulas recursively built up from logical and mathematical symbols, pre-T -theoretical terms p 1 , . . . , p m and
, consisting of all formulas recursively built up from logico-mathematical and the pre-T -theoretical terms alone.
Six Problems of Semantic Theory Holism
That the meaning of T's theoretical terms is characterized by the theory T itself is usually called the phenomenon of semantic holism. Let me now explain six frequently discussed problems associated with semantic holism in scientific theories:
1.) The problem of definability: In the times of Hilbert and Schlick, characterizations of terms by sets of theoretical axioms have been called implicit definitions. But usually these implicit definitions are not at all definitions, because they do not uniquely fix the extensions of the implicitly characterized terms (this is made especially clear by the theorem of Beth). It seem that we have to conclude, as many philosophers of science did, that theoretical terms are simply undefinable.
2.) The problem of analytic-synthetic-distinction: Moreover, if the whole of T characterizes the meaning of the T -theoretical terms, then it seems to be impossible to divide T 's axioms in a non-arbitrary manner into analytic stipulations and synthetic conjectures. That the analytic-synthetic-distinction is generally unclear has been urged by Quine. In the case of scientific theories this consequence seems to be especially forcing.
3.) The problem of compositionality: According to a standard view in semantics, the meaning of sentences or complex terms is compositional, that is, it is determined as a function of the meaning of the syntactic constituents or parts. For example, the meaning of Peter is tall is determined by the meanings of the name Peter, the predicate tall and the copula is. Prima facie, the meaning determination of theoretical terms conflicts with this principle. For the meaning of the T -theoretical terms τ 1 , . . . , τ n occurring in the sentence T (τ 1 , . . . , τ n ) is determined by the meaning of the sentence T (τ 1 , . . . , τ n ): you must understand the theory in the first place in order to understand its T -theoretical terms τ 1 , . . . , τ n . So the meaning determination does not go from the parts of T to the whole of T , but from the whole of T to its T -theoretical parts -this is the core thesis of semantic holism. The same holds for the determination of (extensional) denotations. Very generally, meanings are uniquely associated with functions from possible worlds to denotations. So every way of meaning determination brings with it a structurally similar way of denotation determination within a given world.
4.) The problem of circularity: If the theory T is theoretically non-trivial in the sense that it is not synonymous with a pre-theoretical statement, then T 's meaning must depend on the meaning of its theoretical terms. But on the other hand, the meaning of T 's theoretical terms is determined by the meaning of T . We must understand T in order to understand T 's theoretical terms, and we must understand T 's theoretical terms in order to understand T . So the computation of the meaning of T 's theoretical terms seems to be circular and hence does not lead to any result. Something must have gone badly wrong here.
5.) The problem of incommensurability: How can the defenders of two rivalizing physical theories, say T 1 and T 2 , rationally disagree with each other? Let us assume that T 1 and T 2 contain the same theoretical terms, e.g. mass and force, but they make different theoretical assertions about these terms. Then it seems to follow that the meaning of these terms is different and, hence, the two physicists don't really disagree with each other but just speak about different things. It seems that distinct theories are semantically incommensurable. This is one version of Kuhn's and Feyerabend's famous incommensurability thesis, and it is also one of Fodor's main arguments against strong semantic holism.
6.) The problem of synthetic (non-analytic) content: Connected with the problem of incommensurability is the danger of analyticity: if it is solely my theory T which determines the meaning of my T -theoretical terms, how can I ever be wrong? Whoever attacks some of my theoretical claims seems to speak about different things (cf. Papineau 1996) . Does semantic holism turn every theory into an analytically true statement? How can the synthetic content of a theory be characterized in a non-circular way?
So far, so good. In the next two sections I will reconstruct the RamseyCarnap-Lewis account of theoretical terms, and I will try to explain how this account solves five of these six problems in a straightforward way. The excep-tion is the problem of compositionality which requires further explorations.
The Ramsey-Carnap-Account of Scientific Theories
According to an idea which goes back to Ramsey (1931, pp. 212-215) and was taken up by Carnap, the synthetic content of a theory can be expressed without T 's theoretical terms at all. We just have to existentially quantify over these terms. So the synthetic content of
is expressible in a non-circular manner by: and it can easily be proved that Ketland, 2004, p. 293. Th. 3), so the Ramsey-sentence has the same pre-theoretic consequences as T , which additionally strengthens the view that R(T ) expresses T 's synthetic content (for more details cf. Tuomela, 1973, and Ketland, 2004) . Accordingly, Carnap (1963) (see also Carnap, 1966) proposed to formulate the global analytic content of the theory T as:
It is easily seen that (6) (R(T ) ∧C(T )) ↔ T so the Ramsey-and Carnap-sentences are in sum logically equivalent with T , and it can be proved that Tuomela, 1975, p. 59 ), so C(T ) has no synthetic pre-T -theoretical consequences at all, which gives additional support to the view that C(T ) expresses T 's global analytic content. All this seems to be very nice. I call this the RC-(Ramsey-Carnap) account of theoretical terms.
Let me first mention a subtle problem connected with the Ramsey-sentence: is it a T -theoretical or a pre-T -theoretical statement? This depends:
1.) If you let the 2nd order variables range over arbitrary extensions, i.e. over arbitrary subsets of the domain, and if the domain consists of objects to which one has pre-theoretical or empirical access, then the Ramsey-sentence is a pre-T -theoretical statement. Its content is then the same as the empirical or pre-theoretical content of the theory, and the same holds for the associated classes of pre-theoretical models. This position corresponds to what is called the instrumentalistic theory-view: in this view, no entities beyond observable entities are postulated. This view has been taken by many philosophers of science, from Sneed (1971) and the structuralists up to Ketland (2004) .
2.) On the other hand, if you let the 2nd order variables range over theoretical properties, or if you postulate the existence of new theoretical individuals, then the Ramsey statement is a T -theoretical statement. Then its content is logically stronger than its pre-theoretical content, because not all expansions of pretheoretical models of T will be T -models; only those expansions in which the extensions of the theoretical terms correspond to existing properties are models of T . This position corresponds to what is called the realistic theory-view.
After this clarification let me try to show that the RC-account solves already four of our six problems -all except definability and compositionality.
(1.) The problem of the synthetic content of T (No. 6) is solved: this content is non-circularly specified by R(T ).
(2.) The problem of incommensurability (No. 5) is solved provided we assume that the two rivalizing theories T 1 and T 2 share a common underlying pre-theoretical language. The defender of T 1 can understand the rivalizing theory T 2 perfectly well because she can formulate T 1 's synthetic content in her own pre-theoretical language. And vice versa. The proponents of two rivalizing theories can rationally disagree because both can formulate their Ramseysentences in their shared pre-theoretical language, and their Ramsey-sentences may logically contradict each other.
(3.) The problem of the analytic-synthetic-distinction (No. 2) is solved, or at least dissolved, but only in a global way, by the division of T into the Ramseyand Carnap sentence of T . There is no analytic-synthetic-distinction among T 's axioms: each subset of T 's axioms has its Ramsey-and Carnap-sentence. So every one of T 's axioms figures simultaneously as a synthetic assertion and as part of a meaning characterization. However, this situation creates a successor problem -namely to separate the semantic core axioms of a theory which define the identity of the denotations of the T -terms from peripherical axioms which can be changed without changing the reference of T 's theoretical terms. This distinction is important when considering theory-expansions or -revisions. I cannot enter this problem here (cf. Papineau, 1996 , on this problem).
(4.) The circularity problem (No. 4) is solved: the meaning of T 's theoretical terms is characterized in a non-circular way, by the Carnap-sentence C(T ) saying this: in every world or model, the n-tuple of T 's theoretical concepts denotes some n-tuple of properties which satisfy the open theory formula T (X 1 , . . . , X n ), provided there exists such an n-tuple at all. Otherwise T 's theoretical concepts are denotationless and T is false.
(5.) However, the problem of definability is not solved by the RC-account, on three reasons. First, the meaning characterization of T 's theoretical terms is global but not local -it does not apply to the terms separately. Second, this meaning characterization is not unique: there may exist several different n-tuples of properties in our world which satisfy T ; so the meaning remains indeterminate. Thirdly, the meaning-characterization is only partial: it does not specify the denotation in worlds where the theory is false.
(6.) Finally, the compositionality problem remains unsolved; I will turn to this problem in the section 5.
The Lewis-strengthening of the Ramsey-Carnap Account
Lewis (1970) attempts to repair the troublesome fact that the Ramsey-sentence does not uniquely fix the denotation of the T-terms in models of T. Lewis (1970) and Papineau (1996) argue that a situation of non-uniqueness might be possible in abnormal cases, but normal or at least good scientific theories do fix the denotation of their T-terms uniquely in our world. At least this is something which the defender of a theory should expect and hence, should implicitly assert. So Lewis strengthens the Ramsey-sentence to what I call the LewisRamsey-sentence: 1
Observe that (9) T LR(T ).
Since LR(T ) T , LR(T ) is stronger than T . But Lewis claims that every defender of T implicitly postulates LR(T ). So Lewis takes LR(T ) to express the entire synthetic content of the theory T understood in this implicit way. The major clue of Lewis is the following: based on the fact that the theory strengthened in this way implies the uniqueness condition, Lewis suggests to express T 's analytic content by the following local definitions of T 's theoretical terms by definite descriptions:
(10) Def(T ) (the definition set of T) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
In words: τ i denotes the ith entity in the unique n-tuple of entities satisfying the open theory-formula.
First note that if we treat definite descriptions classically as in Russell's theory (cf. Russell, 1905) (11) A(that x : Fx) :↔ ∃x(A(x) ∧ ∀y(Fy ↔ x = y)), which entails the uniqueness condition ∃ ! xFx, then these 'definitions' would be false in all models where the uniqueness condition fails, in other words, where the Lewis-Ramsey-sentence is false. So these 'definitions' would not really be analytic statements and, hence, would not be definitions. Therefore Lewis assumes a simple free logic of the Dana Scott type (for an overview on free logic cf. Bencivenga, 1986) . In this free logic, definite descriptions with false uniqueness conditions are denotationless; identity formulas are true iff both sides have the same denotation or are both denotationless. In such a free logic Lewis' definition sentences can indeed be verified in all models of the defining terms by assigning either the unique denotation or no denotation to the defined T-terms. So the Lewis definitions can indeed be regarded as analytically true. Moreover, it can be proved that the Lewis definition set is free-logically equivalent with the following global meaning postulate, which I call the Lewis-Carnap-sentence:
(the Lewis-Carnap-sentence). In words: if the open T -formula is uniquely realized then T is true, and else T 's theoretical terms are denotationless.
Again the synthetic content and the analytic content of T are clearly separated in Lewis' account. But now we have a formulation of T 's analytic content by local and seemingly explicit definitions, namely definitions by definite 2nd order descriptions. If we eliminate the theory's theoretical terms by their Lewisdefinitions, we get the so called expanded postulate of T :
(13) EP(T ): (the expanded postulate of T )
In words: T is true for that n-tuple of entities which uniquely satisfy the open T -formula.
The expanded postulate reflects what the theory T asserts in a most direct way, and it will become important below when we discuss compositionality. It is important for Lewis' account that one assume the realistic theory view, that is, the 2nd order quantifiers range over theoretical properties and not over arbitrary subsets of the domain (cf. Papineau, 1996, p. 6, fn. 5) . Therefore the Lewis-Ramsey-sentence and the Lewis definitions are T -theoretical, and not pre-T -theoretical in nature. Would the quantifiers range over arbitrary extensions of the domain, then the demanding uniqueness assumption could not be satisfied. This follows from well-known results about theoretical measurement. The value of theoretical functions is usually only determined for objects under special measurement conditions, and even then only up to scale invariance. Only if the quantifiers range over intensionally specified properties there is realistic hope for the uniqueness conditions to be satisfied. Under this condition I think Lewis has partially solved the definability problem insofar as he has given the best kinds of definitions which are possible. Nevertheless I want to point out that definitions by definite descriptions are different from properly explicit definitions in two crucial respects:
(1.) First: Properly explicit definitions, such as 'bachelors are unmarried men', specify the denotation of the defined term in every model of the defining language. They are unconditional and full definitions. In contrast, definitedescription-definitions specify the denotation of the defined term only in those models of the defining language in which the unique existence condition is satisfied. So they are conditional and merely partial definitions. Lewis argues that in his free logic definite description definitions provide a full meaning characterization because they assign to the term a formal denotation, namely the 'non-denotation', even in models where the unique existence condition fails. But I regard this merely as a formally useful trick: a 'non-denotation' is no more a denotation than 'nothing' is an object. I conclude that also in Lewis' free logic definite descriptions are conditional definitions which provide only a partial meaning specification.
(2.) Second, properly explicit definitions provide us with a measurement method for the defined term in the following sense: they give us a computation method of the (truth) value of the defined term, for any given instance, from the given (truth) values of the defining terms for that instance. If the values of the defining terms are empirically measurable, then this computation method yields a measurement method for the defined term. In contrast, definitions by definite descriptions do not give us any computation or measurement method at all. A 2nd order definite description tells us only that there exists a unique property satisfying a certain theory. In order to evaluate applications of this property for certain instances, we would first have to run through an enumeration of all properties and check for properties in this list satisfying the open theory formula. But an enumeration of all properties is impossible. Theoretical measurement requires the derivation of empirically contentfull 1st order consequences from the theory under special boundary conditions; this question is not even touched by the Lewis method. In this respect, note that the Lewis definition method works also for theories without any empirical content. Consider the example of Feynman (1973, p. 12-2) : (14) Vorce := that property which causes objects free of forces to keep their constant velocity.
This is a perfectly reasonable Lewis-definition, although it does not produce any new empirical content, whence physicists do not believe in the existence of vorces. I conclude: only if a theory has strong empirical content it is reasonable to interpret its theoretical terms realistically. So far I have shown that the RCL-account solves all of the six problems except the problem of compositionality. Let me turn to this final problem.
The Question of Compositionality in the RCL-Account
Consider again the expanded postulate of T in (13) above, which reflects T 's assertion is a most direct way. To simplify considerations, consider a most simple sentence of type (13) with just one F-theoretical and singular term:
Note: (15) is analytically equivalent with the uniqueness condition ∃!Fx.
We assume, as Lewis does, that the sentence (14) receives the truth-value false if the term that x: Fx is denotationless. This implies that the Russell-schema (11) is true in every possible model and, hence, (15) is analytically equivalent with the uniqueness condition. Now, how is the meaning or denotation of the sentence (15) and that of its terms computed? By computing first the extension of the predicate Fx, second the truth value of the uniqueness condition ∃!Fx and hence the truth value of (15), and third, computing therefrom the denotation of the singular term that x: Fx. So the meaning (or denotation) of the singular term is computed from the meaning (or denotation) of the entire sentence. This is the opposite direction of a compositional meaning computation in the standard bottom-up way, which would have to proceed from the meaning of the subsentential terms to the meaning of the sentence. Therefore the computation of (15) is not compositional in this standard sense. I think that this is exactly the point which defenders of theory-holism have in mind. And this point is right. But this flies in the face of a theorem of Hodges (2001) . To understand this theorem, we first explain the formal notion of compositionality. We assume a syntactic term language consisting of a set of terms ∆ built up recursively from a set of atomic terms ∆ at by a set of syntactic operations Σ. A complex term of the language has the syntactic structure σ (t 1 , . . . ,t n ) where the t i are terms and σ is a syntactic operation. A semantics for such a term language is a meaning function µ : ∆ → M which assigns to each term t its meaning µ(t); M a is set of meanings, whatever these meanings are (for example, they many be denotations, or functions from possible worlds into denotations). Such a semantic is called compositional if the following holds:
(16) Formal compositionality of (∆, Σ, µ): For each syntactic operation σ ∈ Σ there exists a semantic operation µ σ such that for all complex terms
Now Hodges (2001) proves an extension theorem which implies the following:
(17) If S is the set of all (meaningful) sentences and µ : S → M is a partial meaning function over S which is compositional and Husserlian over S, then µ has a compositional extension to the set of all terms ∆ which is uniquely determined up to isomorphism.
The proof of (17) rests on the fact that S is cofinal in ∆, which means that every term in ∆ occurs in some sentence in S. The condition of compositionality and Husserlianicity are clearly met for the set of sentences of a first order language including definite descriptions. 2 It follows that there exists a compositional semantics for sentences of the form (15) so that
where 'µ ∈ ' is the meaning function of 'predication'.
True enough. But the point is: the existence of such a compositional bottom up meaning function does imply that we actually compute the meanings along this bottom up function. There may exist at the same time several different meaning functions. Some of them may start somewhere in the middle of the complexity of terms and may spread from there both downwards and upwards in complexity. Some of them may even be entirely top down functions, starting from the meaning of sentences and computing the meaning of subsentential terms therefrom. In fact, the proof of Hodges extension theorem (Hodges, 2001, p. 21) rests on a general method of constructing such a top down meaning function from S to ∆ which determines the meaning of subsentential terms in ∆ up to isomorphism, in a way, that at the same time a compositional bottom up function exists which determines the meaning of sentences from their subsentential terms uniquely. The point I want to make is that we should distinguish between (i) the question of the existence of a formally compositional meaning function, and (ii) the question according to which meaning function we actually compute the meanings of terms. In the case of sentences of type (15), although there exists a compositional bottom-up meaning function, we actually compute the meaning according to a partially top-down meaning function, which goes from the meaning of the predicate (the open theory formula) upwards to the meaning of the sentence (the theory) and from there downwards to the meaning of the singular terms (the theoretical terms). More precisely, the meaning function we actually use is this one (where '|X|' denotes the cardinality of X): Fx) )) = 1, and else '= denotationless'.
The moral which I want to draw is this: whether the actual semantics over a language is compositional does not only depend on the formal existence of a bottom up compositional meaning function, but also on the question whether we actually use this function in our computation (or determination) of meanings. The latter question depends crucially on the following: for which terms can meanings be independently specified, for example by observation or by pre-theoretical means, and for which terms is this not the case? In other words: which meanings figure as independent variables, and which meanings figure as dependent variables, in our actual meaning computation? I suggest to strengthen the formal notion of compositionality into an epistemic notion of procedural compositionality. To explicate this condition, I need to introduce certain cognitive concepts.
A semantic computation algorithm A can be implemented in a human or non-human mind, a computer program, or whatever. Such an algorithm accepts as input the meanings of some terms in ∆. Let M be our range of possible meanings. An input function is a function I : ∆ I → M which assigns meanings to a subset ∆ I of the set of all terms ∆. The terms in ∆ I need not all be syntactically primitive; top down computations methods are admitted. Starting with the input meanings I(t) for t ∈ ∆ I the algorithm A calculates the meanings of certain other terms in ∆, one after the other, in a certain ordering. With ∆(I) we denote the subset of all terms in ∆ which A computes from the input meanings of the terms in ∆ I . So we have:
where in nontrivial computation cases, the left ⊆-relation is a proper subset relation. With µ I : ∆(I) → M we denote the meaning function which A computes over ∆(I) when we feed it with I. It is an important condition that our algorithm outputs every meaning it has computed immediately after computation. So the ordering of the algorithm's outputs reflects the computational route which the algorithm takes. I suggest to formulate the condition of procedural compositionality as follows:
(21) Procedural compositionality: The meaning function generated by a semantic algorithm A is procedurally compositional over a set of terms ∆ iff: (a) for every possible input I : ∆ I → M, the meaning function µ I : ∆(I) → M computed by A agrees with some formally compositional meaning function ν : ∆(I) → M (that is, for all t ∈ ∆(I) : µ(t) = ν(t)), and (b) For every input I : ∆ I → M and complex term σ (t 1 , . . . ,t n ): whenever A computes the meaning of σ (t 1 , . . . ,t n ), then A will first have computed the meanings of t 1 , . . . ,t n .
In this sense, the meaning of F(that x : Fx) is not procedurally compositional for us, because we compute µ(F(that x : Fx)) -not after but -before we can compute µ(that x : Fx).
In conclusion, the semantics of theories is indeed procedurally noncompositional and holistic. This explains several typical semantic facts associated with scientific theories. I mention only one of them: it is often mentioned in the literature on the didactics of physics, that in order to explain the meaning of a theoretical term of a physical theory such as 'force', we really must explain the entire relevant theory. It is impossible to explain the meaning of 'force' first, and then proceed to explain the meaning of Newton's axiom.
Finally a word on Fodor (1987, pp. 73-94) , who has argued against semantic holism in scientific theories. Some of Fodor's points -for example his arguments about the danger of semantic circularity -are refuted in a straightforward way by the RCL-account. One of Fodor's central arguments in favor of compositionality says that compositionality implies the following condition of systematicity which is crucial to explain the semantical creativity of human language speakers (cf. Fodor, 1997): (22) Systematicity: If the meanings of 'a is F' and of 'b is G' are understood, then also the meanings of 'a is G' and 'b is F' are understood.
I want to demonstrate, finally, that systematicity is also guaranteed for theories according to the RCL-analysis, although these theories are not procedurally compositional. Assume a and F are T 1 -theoretical terms, and b and G are T 2 -theoretical terms. According to the RCL-account we have :
(23) F = (that X : ∃!x(T 1 (X, x))) a = (that x : ∃!X(T 1 (X, x) )) G = (that X : ∃!x(T 2 (X, x))) b = (that x : ∃!X(T 2 (X, x))).
One might suspect that because there is no theory which unifies both T 1 and T 2 , systematicity is not possible. But this is not true. Our actual meaning computation is this:
(24) µ(Fa) = µ ∈ (µ(that X : ∃!x(T 1 (X, x))), µ(that x : ∃!X(T 1 (X, x)))), µ(Gb) = µ ∈ (µ(that X : ∃!x(T 2 (X, x))), µ(that x : ∃!X(T 2 (X, x)))). So, understanding the meanings of Fa and of Gb presupposes to understand the meanings of 'that X : ∃!x(T 1 (X, x))', 'that x : ∃!X(T 1 (X, x) )', 'that X : ∃!x(T 2 (X, x))', and of 'that x : ∃!X(T 2 (X, x))'. But this implies that also the meanings of Fb and Ga are understood, namely as follows:
(25) µ(Fb) = µ ∈ (µ(that X : ∃!x(T 1 (X, x))), µ(that x : ∃!X(T 2 (X, x)))), µ(Ga) = µ ∈ (µ(that X : ∃!x(T 2 (X, x))), µ(that x : ∃!X(T 1 (X, x)))). In conclusion, although epistemic (or procedural) theory holism is true, it does not do any harm -it even does not destroy the central feature of systematicity.
